Articles Posted in Likelihood Of Confusion

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In one of the early opinions of 2025, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) reversed the Examining Attorney’s refusal to register a mark based on likelihood of confusion. See  In re Metabeauty, Inc., Serial No. 97492557 (January 28, 2025) [not precedential].  In my opinion, the decision is noteworthy because it relied on only ten third party registrations (and technically only nine) as basis to conclude the shared term “12” is conceptually weak and therefore must receive a restricted scope of protection under U.S. trademark law. When multiple trademarks share a common term and co-exist on the Trademark Register it is referred to as a “crowded field”. See the previous blog posts discussing the crowded field theory, https://www.newyorktrademarkattorneyblog.com/the-federal-circuit-sends-a-strong-message-to-the-ttab/ and also https://www.newyorktrademarkattorneyblog.com/the-second-federal-circuit-decision-weighing-in-on-the-crowded-field-theory/ to better understand this important trademark principle.

The Applicant was seeking to register the number 12 in an octagon shape claiming green as a feature of the mark for nonmedicated skin care preparation in international class 003 and in class 035 for online retail store services featuring medical supplies, cosmetics, tools used for application of skin care preparations among other goods. The Examining Attorney refused the application based on a registration for TWELVE COSMETICS for private label cosmetics in class 003. The Applicant appealed the refusal. The Applicant did not contest the goods were related for confusion purposes. Therefore, the relatedness of the goods was not in dispute, and it was also held that the trade channels overlapped. Moving on to the similarities of the marks, the first consideration is whether the only literal term in the mark, 12 has any weakness for cosmetic products. A trademark’s legal strength is determined by its distinctiveness and its marketplace strength. In re Chippendales USA Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

The cited mark, TWELVE COSMETICS is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness, thus it is presumed inherently distinctive. However, even marks on the Principal Register will vary in strength depending on if the mark is considered to be fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive. Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Third-party registrations are important evidence to show the conceptual strength (distinctiveness) of a trademark since it will  “‘show the sense in which a mark is used in ordinary parlance,’ that is, some segment that is common to both parties’ marks may have ‘a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that segment is relatively weak[.]”’ Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015). It is possible to conclude from third party registrations that a mark is weak due to a specific term, and slight differences can be enough to distinguish one source from another source. Continue reading

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The Board’s Fifth Precedential Case of 2024

Suggestive marks with some conceptual weakness are still afforded a relatively broad scope of protection. See Sage Therapeutics, Inc. v. SageForth Psychological Services, LLC, Opposition No. 91270181 (April 12, 2024) [precedential], where the Board sustained an opposition based on priority and likelihood of confusion grounds. The Applicant was seeking to register the mark SAGEFORTH in standard characters for a lengthy list of services in class 44. The relevant portion included providing information in the field of psychological counseling, assessments, diagnosis, and treatment. The registered mark, SAGE CENTRAL provided services in class 44 for providing health and medical information about postpartum depression and treatment. Opposer pleaded six of its registrations and properly made the registrations part of the record, and because the applicant did not counterclaim to cancel any of the registrations, but merely to restrict the services, priority was not an issue in this case. See our web page entitled, Likelihood of Confusion Refusals 2(d) Refusals, for more on this topic.

The likelihood of confusion analysis was limited to the SAGEFORTH and SAGE CENTRAL registration. Regarding the similarities of the marks, the Board noted that the shared term SAGE was the dominant element in both parties’ marks. The parties noted that the word Sage is used to indicate wisdom or wise advice which is suggesting that the therapy services will provide wise counseling. Because Sage is the first element in each mark it is likely to be remembered by consumers. The Board held that the marks were visually similar since the marks were both Sage formatives. In addition, the marks have similar meanings and structure, and are likely to have the same commercial impression. The Board summed up the issue by stating that the shared Sage term will run the risk that consumers will believe there is an association or connection between the Applicant and Registrant. The similarities of the marks weigh in favor of likelihood of confusion.

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The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or “Board”) reversed the Examining Attorney’s refusal for likelihood of confusion based on identical trademarks, RAO’S for wine and restaurant services. See In re 1729 Investments LLC, Serial No. 90694523 (April 24, 2023) [not precedential]. This is not the first time, the Board reversed on this basis, see our blog post entitled, The TTAB Reverses a Refusal Relying On the Something More Standard (where the applicant applied for beer and the registration covered restaurant services). For more on the “something more” rule see our blog post entitled, The Origin Of The “Something More” Standard In Trademark Law.  The RAO’S case is an example where the TTAB holds the Examining Attorney accountable to its standard of proof. As mentioned above, the marks were identical, applicant was seeking to register RAO’S for wine and registrant was using RAO’S for restaurant and bar services.

The Board first compared the marks. The marks had some inherent conceptual weaknesses as it was a surname in one case and a middle name in the other case. Registrant in fact, sought registration under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act. When a registration is issued based on acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f), then it is an established fact the mark lacks inherent distinctiveness. Since the marks are conceptually weak, they are entitled to a narrower scope of protection. But of course, even weak marks must be protected against a similar or identical mark being registered for related goods and services. In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 216 USPQ 793, 795 (TTAB 1982). The marks are identical in their appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression, thus the first Du Pont factor favors confusion.

The TTAB next assessed the relatedness of the goods and services. It is common knowledge that restaurants often serve alcoholic beverages such as wine, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that patrons and consumers expect wine to emanate from the same source as restaurants. In fact, there is no per se rule that food and beverage products and restaurant services are related. Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 25 USPQ2d 2027, 2030 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Trademark Office has to show “something more” than identical or similar trademarks used for wine and restaurant services. See In re Giovanni Food Co., Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1990, 1992 (TTAB 2011). See also, In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

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A recent precedential case from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or the “Board”) highlights the problems associated with adopting weak marks. See Shenzhen IVPS Technology Co. Ltd. V. Fancy Pants Products, LLC, 2022 USPQ2d 1035 (TTAB 2022) [precedential], where the Board dismissed an opposition under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act because the weakness of the common element SMOK/SMOKES mandated the opposer’s mark be given a narrow scope of protection. In addition to battling enforcement of a weak mark, the opposer did not prove an overlap of trade channels. However, the Board determined that opposer’s electronic cigarettes were related to the applicant’s cigarettes containing tobacco substitutes because both products could be used for the same purpose, vaping or smoking a substance.

Regarding the marks, the Board also held that Applicant’s SMOKES (& Design) mark was the phonetic equivalent of Opposer’s mark, SMOK mark. The interesting twist to this precedential decision is that typically once the Board determines the marks are phonetic equivalents and the goods are related, often the opposition based on 2(d) grounds is sustained, but not so here. Here, the weakness of the opposer’s mark played a pivotal role in dismissing the opposition. See our firm page, Disadvantages of Descriptive Trademarks, for more on this topic.

The mark SMOKES or its phonetic equivalent SMOK is descriptive in connection with Opposer’s electronic cigarettes, parts, and accessories and retail store services featuring those goods. Therefore, the applicant correctly argued that the common wording [SMOKES and SMOK] dictated  a narrow scope of protection be given to opposer’s mark due to its descriptive nature. In fact, the Board relied on the well-established principle that when the word portion of a mark is highly suggestive or descriptive, the presence of a design may be a more significant factor. See In re Hamilton Bank, 222 USPQ 174, 179 (TTAB 1984).

Moreover, if the shared element of the two marks is “weak” in that it is generic, descriptive, or highly suggestive of the goods or services identified in the application or registration, then other matter in the marks may be sufficient to obviate confusion. See In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 229 USPQ 818, 819 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also, See Brooklyn Brewery Corp. v. Brooklyn Brew Shop, LLC, 2020 USPQ2d 10914, at *17 (TTAB 2020). The Board held that the pronunciations were similar and so were the meanings of the applicant’s and the opposer’s marks. Lastly, the Board stated, “Opposer’s SMOK mark and the literal portion of Applicant’s composite mark, SMOKES, have similar commercial impressions because they may evoke smokable goods or goods used for smoking.” However, when considering the marks in their entireties, the Board emphasized that the design features in the applicant’s mark were sufficient to distinguish it from opposer’s mark to avoid confusion. The first DuPont factor favored no confusion.

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Recent Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) Decisions continue to reinforce the importance of good evidence demonstrating similar trademarks in use to weigh against finding a likelihood of confusion. See In re Loew’s Hotels, Inc., Serial Nos. 88425357, 88433338, 88433342, and 88433348 (May 11, 2022) [not precedential], where two refusals for registration were affirmed and two refusals were reversed. The applicant was seeking to register 4 marks: (1) CLOVER CLUB (CLUB disclaimed) standard characters and three stylized or composite marks; (2) ESTD. CLOVER CLUB 2019; (3) CLOVER CLUB MADE IN TEXAS; and (4) MADE IN TEXAS CLOVER CLUB ESTD. 2019. The cited marks were CLOVER, in standard characters and CLOVER in stylized font, both owned by the same registrant. The applicant and registrant identified restaurant services respectively in the application and registration.

The most interesting part of the Board decision involved the sixth DuPont factor, the number and nature of similar marks in use for similar services. This factor is incredibly important because it affects the scope of protection afforded the cited mark(s) and the degree of similarity of the marks required to prove likelihood of confusion. The purpose of third-party use evidence of similar marks is to prove consumers have been educated to differentiate between minute differences. See Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See our web page entitled, Overcoming A 2(d) Refusal With The Crowded Field Argument, for more on this topic.

To make this type of evidence of record, applicants should submit copies of the third-party’s website or social media pages. Only including a hyperlink for the third-party website or information about the website in the appeal brief is insufficient. The third-party use evidence must be relevant as to goods and/or services and based on similarities to the cited mark. The Federal Circuit has determined that evidence of third-party use can be powerful on its face even though specifics as to the extent and impact of use of the third-party trademarks may not have been demonstrated. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also, Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

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The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) issued a precedential decision last week that will be helpful to applicants submitting either a Consent Agreement or a Coexistence Agreement to overcome a likelihood of confusion refusal. Dare Foods Inc. filed an application to register the proposed mark RAINCOAST DIP in standard characters with a disclaimer for “DIP” for snack foods. The Examining Attorney refused the application based on a registration for RAINCOAST TRADING, in standard characters with a disclaimer for “TRADING” for various seafood products.

The Board reversed the refusal stating, “clothed consent agreements where competitors have clearly thought out their commercial interests should be given great weight, and the USPTO should not substitute its judgment concerning likelihood of confusion for the judgment of the real parties in interest without good reason, that is, unless the other relevant factors clearly dictate a finding of likelihood of confusion.” See In re Dare Foods Inc., 2022 USPQ2d 291 (TTAB 2022) [precedential]; Four Seasons Hotels, 26 USPQ2d at 1073 (quoting In re N.A.D. Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 224 USPQ 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also DuPont, 177 USPQ at 568; Am. Cruise Lines, 128 USPQ2d at 1163. See the firm’s blog post entitled, A Precedential Board Decision Giving Great Weight To Consent Agreements, where the Board again reversed a refusal to register while giving substantial weight to the consent agreement entered into between the parties. The Board for In re Dare Foods Inc., concluded a detailed, “clothed” consent agreement will play a dominant role in a likelihood of confusion analysis.

In this case, the Board reviewed the following DuPont factors, similarities of the marks, similarities of the goods, the trade channels and classes of consumers, and the market interface and co-existence agreement. Regarding the marks, it was a simple task. Both applicant’s and registrant’s mark use the identical term RAINCOAST, and both marks contain a descriptive element that was disclaimed in each respective mark. Not only is the dominant element shared, but RAINCOAST appears as the first element in both marks. The marks in their entireties are similar.

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In a recent reversal by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board” or the “TTAB”),  In re Just a Pinch Recipe Club, LLC, Serial No. 88463841 (April 15, 2021) [not precedential], it becomes evident that just because two trademarks share terms, this may not be enough to find a likelihood of confusion. There must be an evaluation of whether the shared terms are distinctive terms and thus strong or highly suggestive or descriptive terms and therefore weak. Assuming that one of the marks contains additional terms (other than the shared terms) that consumers can rely on to distinguish the goods, then the fact that the marks share identical terms may not be enough to support a 2(d) refusal. The applicant in In re Just a Pinch Recipe Club, LLC, was seeking to register the standard character mark PINCH IT! RECIPE BOX (RECIPE disclaimed), and the registrant’s mark was THE RECIPE BOX (RECIPE was disclaimed and the mark was in standard characters). Both parties’ goods were for mobile phone application software for managing recipes. There was no dispute that the goods were related, and the TTAB in the end determined that the goods were either legally identical or closely related.

This case turned on the first (similarities and dissimilarities of the marks) and sixth (number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods) DuPont factors. When assessing whether DuPont factor one weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion the marks in their entireties must be evaluated. This means examining the similarities in the appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression of the marks. Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018). This test focuses on the recollection of the average customer, who retains a general rather than specific impression of marks. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1630 (TTAB 2018).

An important consideration for the comparison of marks’ similarities is whether the marks share identical terms, and whether the shared terms are the dominant part of each respective mark. The dominant term of the registrant’s mark was “RECIPE BOX”. The Board determined that the dominant term of the applicant’s mark, PINCH IT! RECIPE BOX was PINCH IT! The TTAB’s logic was that the term PINCH IT! was arbitrary and it was the first element of applicant’s mark. The first part of a mark is often its dominant portion. See, e.g., In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (the first part of a mark “is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered”); Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1692. Here, the exclamation mark draws attention to the first element and underscores it. Moreover, both marks disclaimed the term “Recipe” since it is descriptive of the parties’ respective goods. The dominant element of the mark will be given greater weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis. The Board concluded that PINCH IT! was the dominant part of the applicant’s mark.

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Since about 90 percent or more of 2(d) cases appealed are affirmed by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”), it is unlikely that the Board disagrees with the Examining Attorney’s conclusions. However, the Board did not see eye to eye with the Examining Attorney on this recently decided matter. In my opinion, the Board got this one right.  The Applicant was seeking to register the mark SIMONIZ CERAMICSHIELD for paint sealant for exterior surfaces of vehicles. The Examining Attorney refused registration based on the mark PLATINUM CERAMIC SHIELD in standard characters and PLATINUM CERAMIC SHIELD & Design for clear coating protectant for use on vehicles with the term “Ceramic”`disclaimed. The Board reversed finding the dominant word in each mark was the first term, SIMONIZ and PLATINUM respectively which allowed consumers to distinguish the sources of the sealant products. See In re Simoniz USA, Inc., Serial No. 85865135 (TTAB November 3, 2020).

In this case, the relatedness of the products was not disputed. Both products are used on vehicles to protect the exterior of the vehicle from environmental elements such as water, air etc. The analysis focused on the similarities and dissimilarities of the marks, since both the Applicant and the Examining Attorney agreed that the first du Pont factor was dispositive in this case. Often, properly identifying the dominant portion of the mark will lead to the ultimate conclusion of whether there will be confusion between the sources of two goods and/or services.

The Examining Attorney argued that the first terms in the respective marks, SIMONIZ and PLATINUM were suggestive and that the more distinctive terms were the shared terms “CERAMIC SHIELD”. The Examining Attorney submitted dictionary definitions for the words Simonize (meaning to polish) and Platinum (of a superior quality). However, the Board, did not agree with the Examining Attorney’s argument that the first terms were suggestive. The Applicant’s mark SIMONIZ CERAMICSHIELD does not use the spelling listed in the dictionary “Simonize”. In addition, the dictionary definition states that the term SIMONIZE has an origin in the term SIMONIZ which is a trademark for metal polish referring to Applicant’s mark. The Board also emphasized the fact that Applicant owns multiple SIMONIZ registrations for coating products for automobiles, including paints, sealants and polishes. The mark SIMONIZ has been in commerce in use with these types of products for over 100 years. SIMONIZ is the oldest brand of automobile products in the marketplace.

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The case I am blogging about today, illustrates why federal registration is so important and how failing to register a mark can have devastating effects for your business. See Jean Leon, S.L. v. La Scala Restaurants, Corp., Opposition No. 91241804 (July 22, 2020) [not precedential], where an opposition was sustained despite the Applicant having senior common law rights. The Applicant was seeking to register the mark JEAN LEON’S LA SCALA for restaurant and cafe services and the registrant filed a Notice of Opposition. The Registrant/Opposer owned the mark JEAN LEON for wines. The Applicant opened a restaurant under the name JEAN LEON’S LA SCALA in Beverly Hills and started using the mark in 1962 but did not register the mark.

Clearly Applicant is the prior user of the mark at common law for restaurant services. However, that fact does not help Applicant with regard to the issue of priority in the opposition. Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a trademark if a mark resembles another mark as to cause confusion. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). One must remember that the policy behind Trademark law is not only to prevent consumer confusion, but it is also to encourage registration of marks.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declared in part: “the board’s requirement that the registrant-opposer also be a prior user impermissively negates the statutory distinction (“or”) in Section 2(d) between a registered mark and a previously-used-but-unregistered mark, would permit simultaneous registration of the same mark for the same goods to different parties, and disregards–in effect conflicts with–Patent Office Rule 2.106(b), which forbids any attack (other than a request for cancellation) on the validity of a registration in an opposition;”, see King Candy Co., v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110-11 (CCPA 1974). Therefore, Applicant’s prior use at common law is irrelevant to the question of whether Applicant can register its mark with the USPTO.

This highlights an important lesson that a senior first user must either oppose a confusingly similar mark when it publishes, or initiate a cancellation proceeding within five years from the registration date, or else the first user can lose the opportunity to effect cancellation. The first user of the mark is then penalized by the law and is unable to register its mark. However, the right to exclusive use may be determined in district court. If an opposition is sustained, then the Applicant-senior user is forced to undertake the financial burden to initiate a court action.

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In a recent Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board” or “TTAB”) decision a refusal is reversed based on the second DuPont factor. On the last day of December 2019, the Board issued a decision stating that the “related services doctrine (services provided in connection with the same goods) has no application here.” See In re Costa Farms LLC, Serial No. 87674168 (December 31, 2019) [not precedential]. In this case, the applicant was seeking registration of the mark GROW WITH US in standard characters on the Principal Register. The application identified the following goods, “Live flowers and living plants in International Class 31”. The Examining Attorney cited the mark, GROW WITH US in standard characters for the following services, “Distributorship services in the field of wholesale horticulture supplies and accessories” in International Class 35. The applicant appealed after the Examining Attorney issued a final refusal on likelihood of confusion grounds.

The Board, as in all decisions based on likelihood of confusion, stated that the two key considerations in the analysis are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods and services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Another important consideration is the similarity of the trade channels and whether there would be the same customers for the goods and services. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). If there are DuPont factors that are not relevant to the facts of a particular case, the Board will only consider the pertinent factors. The other factors are treated as neutral.

Since the parties’ marks were identical, the Board focused on the similarities and differences of the goods and services. On this point, the law requires that the goods and services be related in some manner and/or that circumstances involving the marketing give rise to a mistaken belief that the goods and services come from the same source. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Analysis of the relatedness of the goods and services is based on the language used in the application and registration. One special rule that will apply here will be since the marks are legally identical there will be a lesser degree of relatedness required between the goods and services. See our blog post entitled, How To Overcome A 2(d) Likelihood Of Confusion Refusal, for more strategies in responding to Office Actions involving 2(d) refusals.

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